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Abstract. The purpose of this paper is to offer some critical remarks on the so-called 
pragmatist approach to the regulation of robotics. To this end, the article mainly 
reviews the work of Jack Balkin and Joanna Bryson, who have taken up such ap-
proach with interestingly similar outcomes. Moreover, special attention will be paid 
to the discussion concerning the legal fiction of ‘electronic personality’. This will 
help shed light on the opposition between essentialist and pragmatist methodologies. 
After a brief introduction (1.), in 2. I introduce the main points of the methodological 
debate which opposes pragmatism and essentialism in the regulation of robotics and 
I examine how legal fictions are framed from a pragmatist, functional perspective. 
Since this approach entails a neat separation of ontological analysis and legal rea-
soning, in 3. I discuss whether considerations on robots’ essence are actually put 
into brackets when the pragmatist approach is endorsed. Finally, in 4. I address the 
problem of the social valence of legal fictions in order to suggest a possible limit of 
the pragmatist approach. My conclusion (5.) is that in the specific case of regulating 
robotics it may be very difficult to separate ontological considerations from legal 
reasoning—and vice versa—both on an epistemological and social level. This calls 
for great caution in the recourse to anthropomorphic legal fictions. 
Keywords. Essentialism, pragmatism, legal fictions, electronic personality, anthro-
pomorphism 
1. Introduction 
The purpose of this paper is to offer some (admittedly partial and non-systematic) re-
marks on the so-called pragmatist approach to the regulation of robotics as opposed to 
the essentialist approach. In order to do that, I will mainly focus on the work of Jack 
Balkin and Joanna Bryson, who have taken up the pragmatist approach with interestingly 
similar outcomes.  
Special attention will also be paid to the question concerning the role that legal fic-
tions such as the ‘electronic personality’ may play in this scenario. Since pragmatists 
frame this problem in functional and anti-essentialist terms, to see whether such terms 
can actually be met will hopefully put the study on the right track.  
After introducing the main arguments of the methodological debate that opposes 
pragmatism and essentialism in the regulation of robotics, I will discuss Balkin’s and 
Bryson’s suggestions on ‘robotic’ legal fictions and ‘electronic personality’ by asking 
three questions: 
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• From a pragmatist perspective, when is it appropriate to introduce legal fic-
tions? (section 2.) 
• Can essentialist considerations be entirely put into brackets? (section 3.) 
• Is legal convenience the only criterion needed to decide whether to introduce 
the ‘electronic personality’ fiction? (section 4.) 
2. Legal Fictions as Functional Regulatory Constructs 
2.1. Robots, Legal Fictions, and Law’s Ends 
Let me start by sketching the methodological background of the topic I wish to address. 
As Jack Balkin [1] explains, the many issues concerning the regulation of robotics are 
usually addressed in two opposite ways, which he labels “essentialism” and “pragma-
tism”. 
In a nutshell, the advocators of essentialism argue that legal frameworks for robotics 
should be tailored on ontological analyses of robots’ essential qualities or capabilities [2-
4]. In other words, it is maintained that the first step towards the proper regulation of 
robotics is to determine what a robot is and is not—and, more importantly, what a robot 
can and cannot do. This not only requires a certain degree of scientific knowledge of the 
technology involved, but also relies on philosophical discussions to give meaning and 
context to it. In sum, according to this view the legal task is supposed to be based on an 
ontological study into the essence of robots. 
In The Path of Robotic Law, Balkin highlights two main limitations of essentialism 
[1, p. 45]. First, due to the inner vitality of robotic research and the ever-changing ways 
in which new technologies impact people’s lives, it appears quite difficult, if not impos-
sible, to define what a robot is in a way that can at the same time be accurate, informative, 
and of some use for regulatory purposes [5, pp. 217f.]. 
Secondly, and more interestingly, the connection between ontological analysis and 
legal reasoning has not been traditionally seen as binding. This is true, in particular, when 
proposals for the attribution of rights and obligations to non-human entities are ad-
vanced–as notably happens with robots (see infra). Grounding regulatory measures on 
ontological premises is risky, as it could potentially lead to a framework too rigid to 
properly address the ever-changing ways in which technologies modify our habits.  
In this situation, then, it may be better to adopt a more pragmatic attitude. Accord-
ingly, Balkin suggests readdressing attention from robots’ essence to how their uses 
transform specific aspects of social practices which are valuable for and can be regulated 
by law. “When we consider how a new technology affects law,” Balkin writes, “our focus 
should not be on what is essential about the technology but on what features of social 
life the technology makes newly salient” in relation to law’s ends [1, p. 46].  
This claim, as the author points out [1, p. 46], is grounded on a functional theory of 
law, according to which legal systems are to be understood by the social function they 
carry out or the social ends they serve. Consequently, a good legal framework for robot-
ics would be one which served law’s ends properly.  
Once such ends are spelled out, then, what is left is an instrumental task: means are 
to be devised to achieve given ends. In carrying out this task, lawmakers should be left 
free to abstract from ontological considerations. For example, they should be left free to 
turn to legal fictions—artificial constructs which carry no ontological commitment but 
work as useful means to ends which are valuable in the eyes of the law [1, p. 59]. This, 
in fact, is merely a technical matter and bears no implication outside the legal domain. 
Ontology, on the contrary, would unnecessarily tie law’s hands. Therefore, it should be 
kept out of the picture. 
2.2. Legal Personality for Robots? 
A similar line of reasoning is applied in Of, For, and By the People by Joanna Bryson, 
Mihailis Diamantis, and Thomas Grant [6] in order to discuss the proposition of granting 
some form of legal personality to robots as a regulatory tool [7, 8]. This attribution would 
be fictional, meaning that it would neither be based on ontological analysis nor entail 
any ontological claims; it would rather be a purely legal act, entirely independent from 
ontological accounts of such entities as natural persons. The purpose of this act—i.e., to 
help allocate responsibilities, uphold rights, and determine obligations in concrete situa-
tions [9, pp. 18f.]—would also be of a purely legal nature. Hence, it would be an error 
to oppose the attribution of legal personality to robots on ontological grounds. The matter 
must be discussed exclusively in legal terms [5, pp. 242f]. 
In Bryson’s and colleagues’ view, legal systems are social products whose purpose 
is to promote the material interests of legal persons, to protect important moral rights and 
to enforce relevant moral obligations–especially and primarily those of human beings [6, 
pp. 282-283]. In this scenario, the debate on electronic personality becomes “ultimately 
a pragmatic question—Does endowing robots with this legal right or that legal obligation 
further the purposes of the legal system?” [6, p. 282].2  
The authors’ answer to such pragmatic question is that the costs of attributing legal 
personality to artificial agents would overcome the benefits. It is unclear, in fact, how 
robots endowed with legal personality would respond to accusations or would be 
properly punished for breaking the law or falling short of their obligations. All things 
considered, attributing legal personality to robots may turn out to facilitate “the unnec-
essary abrogation of responsibility of marketers and operators of AI” [10, p. 3]. This, in 
turn, would result in “weakening the legal protections for humans” [6, p. 275], which 
contrasts with law’s ends.  
Veil-piercing, i.e., the possibility to see through the fictional personality of robots 
and locate the human beings who are in some way and to a certain degree responsible 
for their doings, is the most important point of this issue [6, pp. 286-287; 11]. Hence, 
every step taken towards the regulation of robotics must not interfere but enforce such 
possibility, especially as veil-piercing is a very delicate strategy which is therefore rarely 
applied [6, pp. 286-287]. As a consequence, the recourse to the ‘electronic personality’ 
legal fiction should be avoided since it entails too many legal risks. 
2.3. The Pragmatist Approach 
Balkin’s and Bryson’s arguments share a common structure. Its basic premises are a 
functional theory of law and the determination of the ends to be attained through regu-
lating robotics. In the epistemological context set up by such premises, the law is free to 
act in its best interests. This last statement implies a third premise: as Benjamin Allgrove 
[8, p. 71] suggests, “a clear demarcation (is) to be drawn between the philosophical and 
legal issues”. 
This leaves very little doubt on how the first question addressed by this article is to 
be answered. Let me recall it: from a pragmatist perspective, when is it appropriate to 
introduce legal fictions?  
From this angle, the only thing that matters is how legal fictions perform within their 
legal context. Constructs like ‘electronic personality’ are both fictional and functional. 
They are fictional, meaning context-specific, since they are not supposed to apply outside 
of the social and epistemological dimension to which they belong. Moreover, they are 
functional, since they are introduced to serve the specific purposes of the law: they are 
means to given ends, that is, they are conceptual tools [6, pp. 277-280]. 
As a consequence, the only proper assessment of legal fictions is analogous to the 
kind of assessment we normally carry out to judge tools. All is needed is an evaluation 
of their legal usefulness [9, p. 19] or convenience [8, pp. 77-82], which implies carrying 
out a cost-benefit analysis. From a pragmatist point of view, the introduction of a partic-
ular legal fiction depends exclusively on such cost-benefit analyses.  
This kind of assessment is ultimately domain-specific. The introduction of legal fic-
tions, then, is a technical matter which has to be discussed and settled in technical terms. 
Since the essentialist approach fails to acknowledge the autonomy of legal reason, it 
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loses in flexibility, elegance, and clarity. On the contrary, the superiority of the pragma-
tist approach lies in the economy of its functional premises, which entails a clear-cut 
separation between philosophical and legal concerns. 
3. Legal Fictions and the Essence of Robots 
Within the boundaries of the pragmatist approach, things appear to be sufficiently clear. 
However, the premises of such approach can be partially put into question. More specif-
ically, the separation of ontological analysis and legal reasoning may turn out to be a 
condition very hard to satisfy. On a theoretical level the argument is surely solid. How-
ever, is it practically feasible to keep ontological and legal considerations entirely apart 
from one another? To recall the second question posed in section 1.: can essentialist 
considerations be entirely put into brackets? 
3.1. Special-Purpose Human Beings 
In order to elaborate on this question, let me first take into consideration Balkin’s work. 
Even though his rebuttal of essentialism is absolute, in the course of his argument several 
claims on the essence of technological and robotic products are nonetheless advanced or 
implied. Interestingly enough, such claims are in line with his legal recommendations.  
The relevance of ontological conceptions is most perceivable in Balkin’s discussion 
of the so-called “substitution effect” [1, 12]. This phenomenon builds on our well-proven 
tendency to anthropomorphize machines and project feelings, intentions, social skills, 
and (most importantly) agency onto them. As Balkin explains, we tend to treat robots as 
special-purpose human beings, i.e., entities which execute particular functions in ways 
which appear to be very similar to our own and therefore should be interpreted by refer-
ence to analogous criteria. However, this is just a false impression, which ultimately 
leads to the ‘homunculus fallacy’: “the belief that there is a little person inside the pro-
gram who is making it work—it has good or bad intentions, and it makes the program 
do good or bad things” [12, p. 1223].  
Apparently, then, the special way in which robots may be considered as human be-
ings makes them not a particular kind of human being at all, but rather a particular kind 
of tool. The substitution of robots for human beings is therefore “incomplete, contextual, 
unstable, and, above all, opportunistic” [1, p. 57], since the essential difference that sep-
arates tools from fully autonomous and fully responsible agents cannot be actually over-
come. In a word, Balkin maintains that what robotic technologies do is to mediate human 
actions in society: robots are tools human beings use to achieve their purposes [1, pp. 
46-49] [12, pp. 1222-1223].  
Framing robots by reference to the category of tool inevitably influences the discus-
sion of how to allocate legal responsibility for harm caused by machines. Being tools, 
even though of a particular kind, robots should not be held directly responsible of any 
harm caused by their functioning. Legal responsibility should instead be allocated among 
the human subjects involved in their use [5, 13]: “Our interactions with robots and AI 
systems”, Balkin writes, “are interactions with the people who are deploying these new 
technologies, even when we do not realize it” [1, p. 59]. Hence the need for lawmakers 
to focus less on robots’ essence and more on the social practices new technologies me-
diate and on the social actors involved. 
In Balkin’s work, then, there is indeed an ontological distinction between what it 
means to be human and what it means to be a robot. This distinction in fact underlies his 
main legal advice not to lose sight of the human factor. It is to be noted, however, that 
ontological analyses that challenge the categorization of robots in terms of tools also lead 
to different solutions concerning the issue of assigning responsibility when artificial 
agents are involved [14, 15]. 
3.2. Purpose-Built Artifacts 
Balkin’s expression ‘special-purpose human beings’ reminds strongly of Joanna 
Bryson’s definition of artificial agents as “purpose-built artifacts” [16]. This definition 
is in my opinion particularly effective, since it highlights intuitively the fact that robots, 
no matter how much human-like or ‘autonomous,’ currently are and need not be more 
than products designed for practical use. More precisely, artificial agents are tools [17, 
18] that extend “our own motivational systems […] as a sort of mental prosthetic to our 
own needs and desires” [10, p. 3].  
The expressions ‘special-purpose human beings’ and ‘purpose-built artifacts’ show 
indeed two sides of the same coin. I have already mentioned why Balkin’s expression 
can be related to Bryson’s definition: despite their apparent human-likeness, robots are 
just tools. On the other hand, Bryson’s definition is completed by Balkin’s expression in 
a correspondent way. In fact, the seemingly ‘autonomous’ behavior of artificial agents, 
combined with our uncertainty of what makes us really ‘human,’ compels us to overi-
dentify with artificial agents and humanize them [16]. Bryson’s proposition that robots 
should be regarded as slaves or servants [17] must also be read against this background: 
robots can be the kind of intelligent tools slaves were inhumanely reduced to. In sum, 
both Balkin and Bryson agree on one important point: while it is true that “robotics blurs 
the very line between people and instruments”, as Calo [3, p. 515] and many others note, 
this line nonetheless exists and should not be overlooked [16]. 
Indeed, Bryson and colleagues refer to the legal side of the debate concerning the 
essence of artificial agents [6, pp. 283-284]. In a nutshell, this debate revolves around 
the question of whether robots should be framed as tools, and therefore objects of law 
[5, 13], or as selves, and therefore subjects of law [15, pp. 186-199; 19, 20]—with the 
caveat that both categories must be reconsidered. Although this would not be entirely 
legally binding, the authors seem willing to recognize at least some weight to such in-
quiries.  
On this point Bryson’s stance is very clear: “(r)obots are not persons unless we build 
them to be such and then declare them to be so. Even if we do this, they will always be 
our creations and our responsibilities”. Any attempt to “legally declare” robots “respon-
sible for their actions […] should in fact be considered an abdication of human respon-
sibility for our artifacts” [17, p. 197; 10].  
Bryson’s ideas concerning what robots are and can do, then, are completely in line 
with her legal recommendations. In addition to the fact that the legal fiction of ‘electronic 
personhood’ does not perform very well within the legal system, it is also noteworthy 
that such legal fiction awkwardly clashes with what we know about robots’ essence or 
essential characteristics. It goes without saying that different accounts of what it means 
to be an artificially intelligent robot would lead to correspondingly different legal rec-
ommendations [20]. 
3.3. Summary 
In sum, even though the pragmatist approach is supposed to have no connection to onto-
logical analyses, both papers touch upon ontological tenets which try as prudently as 
possible to set at least some very general guidelines concerning what robotic technolo-
gies are and can do. Moreover, such remarks are evidently consistent with the legal rec-
ommendations the authors submit and (most likely) influence them.  
It is nonetheless true that these observations are necessarily controversial, since it 
cannot be proven that the authors’ beliefs concerning robots’ essential features actually 
determine their regulatory advice—correlation is not causation. I can only raise the sus-
picion that the line that separates essentialism and pragmatism may be not as clear-cut 
as initially supposed. 
4. ‘Robotic’ Legal Fictions and Social Imagination 
4.1. The Social Valence of Legal Fictions 
These last controversial notes point to another issue that I deem most relevant to the 
debate on essentialism and pragmatism—that is, the social valence of legal fictions.  
The mutual relationship between ontological beliefs and legal concepts is problem-
atic above and beyond the methodological perspective as well. As seen earlier, pragma-
tism understands legal systems as socio-cultural constructs that serve the general purpose 
of human environmental adaptation. As Balkin notes, this theory uncovers an interesting 
connection between technology and the law: “Technology”, he writes, “like the law, me-
diates social relations between human beings, including relations of power and control” 
[1, p. 47]. Both technology and the law, in a sense, could be interpreted as cultural prod-
ucts functional to social life—that is, as socio-cultural tools.  
If both technology and the law can be thought of as social tools, it may be interesting 
to apply to legal systems as well Peter-Paul Verbeek’s ideas on how technological tools 
impact society and human life. As he thoroughly argues in [21], tools do not simply help 
users to achieve particular goals: they also contribute to shaping the practical contexts in 
which these same tools are utilized. Technological tools, robot included [13], co-shape 
our perception and constitution of the world, of the entities that compose it, and of our-
selves. Their influence extends beyond the context of the specific function they are built 
to execute. These tools have wide-ranging implications in everyday life, deeply affecting 
our personal, social, and cultural views of the world. Similarly, one could argue that legal 
systems, as socio-cultural tools, co-shape the practices they are intended to regulate and 
influence the social understanding of the entities involved in such practices.  
The legal and social understandings of robots are connected in many ways. For ex-
ample, Wurah suggests that “if we welcome robots into our communities, we cannot let 
ourselves forget that the rights they possess will be a reflection of our society” [22, p. 
69]. More generally, as Allgrove notes, “if society treats (ro)bots as autonomous actors, 
it puts pressure on the law to give legal effects to this social perception” [8, p. 75]. Fur-
thermore, Calo draws attention to the fact that “the way judges conceive of robots could 
affect their decisions in cases involving robotics” [23, pp. 224-225]. These quotes sug-
gest that social understandings of robots influence the legal frameworks devised to reg-
ulate them. Nevertheless, it may also be argued that the way robotic products are legally 
framed will feedback on the social understanding of such technologies. This, in turn, 
could trigger legal demands of non-fictional nature that, however, originate in social at-
titudes resulting in part from fictional constructs [24, pp. 1837f.].  
If laws do not only reflect social attitudes and practices, but also contribute to shap-
ing them, then the fictional character of legal fictions becomes immediately problematic 
in the case of robotics. The fictional character of legal fictions, a technical and subtle 
feature of legislation, may in fact turn out to be too easily overlooked on a social level, 
ultimately leading to fallacious dispositions towards robots (see the ‘Android Fallacy’ in 
[4]). Thus, in the case of robotics, the impact of legal fictions may transcend any specific 
regulatory domain and affect social life more in general.  
If this argument holds, although lawmakers may very well abstract from essential 
considerations when devising their strategies, we must be wary of how fictional con-
structs may feedback on the ways in which social actors will frame related experiences 
and the entities involved in them. As Lehman-Wilzig [19, p. 542] pointed out, granting 
legal personality to robots “does obviously mark a quantum emotional and philosophical 
leap from a human perspective”. Legal fictions can indeed have a relevant impact on 
social experiences and interpretative frameworks. As a result, it is important to ask: Is 
legal convenience the only criterion needed to decide whether to introduce the ‘electronic 
personality’ fiction? 
4.2. Robots, Anthropomorphism, and Legal Fictions 
It is easy to see why it is important to ask the above question. Unlike business corpora-
tions, governmental organizations, ships, idols, and other non-human entities to which 
legal personality has been granted, robots expose us to the many ethical, psychological, 
and social risks of anthropomorphism [3, pp. 547-548; 4, pp. 18-21], such as the “mis-
assignations of responsibility and misappropriations of resources” [18, p. 63]. Several 
studies in human-robot interaction (HRI) show that our tendency to anthropomorphize 
machines is instinctual and deeply rooted in our psychology. However, as Balkin and 
Bryson are well aware of, overidentification with robots results in the attribution to ma-
chines of qualities which are exclusively human. This is why Bryson insists on the im-
portance of framing robots as purpose-built artifacts or servants, and why Balkin worries 
about the substitution effect caused by our instinctual understanding of robots as special-
purpose human beings.  
Bryson and colleagues open their essay by pointing out that “[f]ictions abound with 
artificial human-like characters” [6, p. 274]. The recourse to legal fictions, which would 
in some way frame robots and human beings by reference to partially similar criteria, 
may feedback on social imagination and contribute to enforcing the already powerful 
impulse to overidentify with robots, supported as it is by popular culture and probably 
will be by design and commercial strategies. In the case of robots, then, it may be very 
difficult to prevent the fictional character of legal fictions from conditioning social im-
agination and informing beliefs on robots, which would in turn impact on how robots are 
perceived and treated in everyday life. 
For all the above reasons, in the case of robotics the question concerning the legal 
convenience of introducing fictions which imply some form of anthropomorphism may 
require a wider critical evaluation than the instrumental assessment presented in section 
2. The focus of such a wider evaluation would not be to determine whether a fictional 
construct serves the ends of a regulatory strategy, but to consider how this construct 
would affect the general perception of robots in society [22, p. 173-174].  
In sum, it would seem that the human tendency to anthropomorphize robots is a 
crucial element of discussion in debates concerning ‘robotic’ legal fictions. This ten-
dency is independent from the law, but the law may enforce it. As both Balkin and 
Bryson stress, overidentification with machines is a dangerous illusion and must there-
fore be curbed so that its potential benefits (for instance in terms of greater acceptance 
of robots in society) are prudently balanced by measures that constantly point to the fic-
tional character of this identification, protecting society from generalizing its validity. 
However, the mere fact that anthropomorphism must be framed as an illusion, a fiction, 
or a fallacy, presupposes that we know why robots cannot be considered human beings, 
which in turn assumes that we carry out ontological analyses of robots, and that the re-
sults of these analyses inform legislative measures as well as social initiatives. Ulti-
mately, it seems that at least on a social level pragmatism cannot entirely dispense with 
some form of ontological support. 
5. Conclusion 
This essay attempted to demonstrate that the relationship between ontological analysis 
and legal reasoning in regulatory approaches to robotics may be more complex than is 
sometimes thought. On the one hand, it is potentially very difficult to clearly distinguish 
between ontological tenets and pragmatic considerations. Moreover, in the specific case 
of the regulation of robotics, extra-legal phenomena must be taken into account as well 
(in particular, the many issues posed by human overidentification with robots). Because 
of this complexity, the impact of legal fictions has the potential to overstep the episte-
mological boundaries of regulatory strategies and affect social life in a wider sense. This, 
in turn, can modify how society conceptualizes robots in dangerous ways. In conclusion, 
it appears that ontological considerations around robots are not only presupposed by 
some pragmatist legal discussions, but also necessary to preserve the demarcation be-
tween reality and fiction in a context where the line that separates these two domains is 
constantly challenged. 
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